How can a country graduate from procyclical fiscal policy? : evidence from China by Fuest, Clemens & Xing, Jing
Dis cus si on Paper No. 15-068
How Can a Country ‘Graduate’  
from Procyclical Fiscal Policy?  
Evidence from China
Clemens Fuest and Jing Xing
Dis cus si on Paper No. 15-068
How Can a Country ‘Graduate’  
from Procyclical Fiscal Policy?  
Evidence from China
Clemens Fuest and Jing Xing
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp15068.pdf
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von  
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung  
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other  
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly  
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
 How can a country ‘graduate’ from procyclical fiscal policy? Evidence from 
China 
 
Clemens Fuest 
ZEW and University of Mannheim 
 
Jing Xing 
Antai College of Economics and Management 
Shanghai Jiao Tong University 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this study, we analyze the cyclicality of fiscal policies in China during the period 
1978-2013. We find that the cyclicality of local government spending in China 
significantly affects the cyclicality of total government spending. By employing both 
time-series and province-level panel data, we show that local budgetary government 
spending was strongly procyclical during the 1980s, but it became counter-cyclical 
with respect to nationwide output fluctuations and acyclical with respect to 
region-specific output shocks since the mid-1990s. We argue that these are likely to be 
consequences of the 1994 fiscal reform, which revamped the fiscal relations between 
the central and local governments, reduced the procyclicality of local government 
budgetary revenue and brought in counter-cyclical intergovernmental transfers. 
Findings of this study contribute to the debate on how developing and emerging 
countries, in particular those with federal fiscal structures, could reduce the 
procyclicality of their fiscal policies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Macroeconomic stabilization is widely seen to be an important objective of fiscal 
policy. Achieving this stabilization requires spending to increase during economic 
downturns while taxes revenues should decrease, and vice versa. To some extent this 
happens automatically. For instance, if jobs are lost in an economic downturn, income 
tax revenue declines and expenditure on unemployment benefits increases. This 
automatic stabilization effect should be complemented by anticyclical discretionary 
fiscal policy measures. Observed fiscal policy, however, is often procyclical, 
undermining the effect of automatic stabilizers. The cost of procyclical fiscal policy is 
high, not just in terms of a loss in stability but also in the form of lower economic 
growth (Aghion and Marinescu, 2007). 
 
In the literature, the procyclicality of fiscal policy is seen to be most pronounced in 
developing or emerging economies (Gavin and Perotti 1997; Talvi and Végh, 2005; 
and Ilzetzki and Végh, 2008, Frenkel et al. 2013). This phenomenon is usually linked 
to the lack of access to international credit markets (Gavin and Perotti, 1997) and poor 
institutions (Alesina and Tabellini, 2008). In the developed world, the issue of 
procyclical fiscal policy is seen to be most relevant in federations, especially for 
government spending at the sub-national level (Abbott and Jones, 2012; Clemens and 
Miran, 2012; and Rodden and Wibbels, 2010).1 Similar to the case of developing 
countries, procyclical fiscal policy at the sub-national level is often explained by 
limited access of local governments to the credit market. It is also explained by 
institutional restrictions such as balanced budget requirements or insufficient 
counter-cyclical intergovernmental transfers.2 
 
China is both an emerging economy and a country with highly decentralized public 
spending. It is also viewed by various authors as a country with quasi federal 
structures (Qian and Weingast, 1997; Roland, 1999). Yet we argue in this paper that 
sub-national spending in China since the mid-1990s is perhaps an exception to the 
usual pattern of procyclical fiscal policy at the sub-national level. We argue that this 
is likely to be a consequence of the 1994 reform of the fiscal system in China. While 
sub-national spending was strongly procyclical before 1994, this pattern changed after 
the reform. Yet this does not mean that there is no room for improvement: while 
sub-national spending in China is countercyclical with regard to nationwide business 
cycles since 1994, it is rather acyclical with respect to local cycles. 
 
1 For example, Rodden and Wibbels (2010) argue that ‘Subnational finance in several of the world’s 
most decentralized federations is overwhelmingly pro-cyclical.’ (p. 59.). 
2 According to the normative theory of fiscal federalism (Musgrave 1959, Oates 1972, 1999), active 
fiscal stabilisation policies are a task of the central government, not of subcentral governments. This is 
because stabilisation policies of regional or local governments will lead to spillovers, so that individual 
jurisdictions have few incentives to engage in these policies. But this does not imply that fiscal policies 
of subcentral governments should be procyclical. 
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 Using both aggregate time series and provincial panel data during the period 
1978-2013, we find that: 1) the cyclicality of provincial government spending in 
China significantly affects the cyclicality of overall government spending; 2) 
provincial government spending in China was highly procyclical before the 1994 
fiscal reform but the degree of procyclicality is substantially reduced post the reform; 
3)provincial government revenue became less procyclical after 1994; 4) provinces 
where value added taxes were used more intensively had less procyclical revenue and 
5) the intergovernmental transfer system in China helps reduce the procyclicality of 
provincial government spending, in particular with respect to nationwide output 
fluctuations. 
 
The contribution of our study to the literature is as follows. Frankel et al. (2013) find 
that about a third of the developing world has been able to ‘graduate’ from procyclical 
fiscal policies since the 1960s. These authors emphasize the role of institutions, such 
as the depth of financial integration and political checks and balances, in reducing the 
procyclicality of fiscal policies in developing countries. Earlier studies come to 
similar conclusions (Gavin and Perotti, 1997, Alesina and Tabellini, 2008). Our case 
study of China provides new perspectives on how countries, especially developing 
countries, could graduate from procyclical fiscal policies. First and foremost, our case 
analysis of China highlights the important role of the fiscal relations between the 
central and local governments in affecting the cyclicality of fiscal policies in any 
fiscal federations. To achieve anti-cyclical fiscal policies in fiscal federations, it is 
therefore crucial to take into account the incentives for different levels of 
governments and the behavior interactions between them.  
 
Second, we find that tax revenue structures play an important role in the cyclicality of 
fiscal policies. One significant change in the tax revenue structures brought by the 
1994 fiscal reform in China is the introduction of the value-added tax as an important 
source of tax revenue.3 We find that provinces where the value-added tax became a 
more important source of tax revenue post 1994 also experienced a more substantial 
reduction in the procyclicality of tax revenue, consistent with the hypothesis that the 
value-added tax provides a more stable tax base than direct taxes. 
 
Third, our analysis of the Chinese experiences highlights the role of 
intergovernmental transfers in changing the cyclicality of local government spending 
in fiscal federations. While previous studies find that intergovernmental transfers are 
often procyclical so that they exacerbate the procyclicality of local government 
spending (Abbott and Jones, 2012; Blöchliger and Égert, 2013), we show that 
intergovernmental transfers and grants in China since 1994 are strongly 
3 The concept of the value-added tax was first brought to China in the mid-1980s. However, before 
1994 the value-added tax in China was restricted to a few products in a few manufacturing industries. It 
was not until the 1994 fiscal reform that the value-added tax is applied to a wide range of industries and 
became an importance tax revenue source for the government. Local governments were only able to 
maintain a share of the value-added taxes since the 1994 fiscal reform (Gordon and Li, 2013). 
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 countercyclical with respect to nationwide output shocks and weakly counter-cyclical 
towards region-specific output shocks. As intergovernmental transfers play a crucial 
role in financing local government after 1994, the transfer system helps reduce the 
procyclicality of local and total government spending. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the series of 
fiscal reforms in China since 1978, with a focus on the tax revenue sharing reform in 
1994. In Section 3, we use time-series data to analyze the cyclicality of government 
spending in China during 1979-2013. In Section 4, we analyze the cyclicality of 
provincial government spending before and after the 1994 fiscal reform using 
provincial panel data. In Section 5, we discuss the role of the value-added taxes. We 
also discuss whether intergovernmental transfers in China are sufficient to smooth 
region-specific output shocks. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Stylized facts and policy background 
 
2.1 Cyclicality of government spending in China: an overview 
 
The Chinese economy has been growing at a phenomenal rate since the opening-up 
policy in 1978. Nevertheless, as Brandt and Zhu (2000) point out, the Chinese 
economy also exhibited a marked cyclical pattern. Figure 1 illustrates the time-series 
evolution of the growth rates of real total government budgetary spending and real 
GDP in China since 1979. We observe a strong co-movement of the two growth rates 
before 1994, suggesting total government spending during this period was likely to be 
procyclical. This pattern, however, is less pronounced since 1994. In fact, these two 
growth rates moved in opposite directions in most years after 1994, notably during the 
mid to late 1990s and since the global financial crisis in 2008.  
 
The GDP growth rate for the whole country, nevertheless, hides much variation in the 
growth experiences across regions. China has 27 provinces and 4 municipalities, each 
with distinct economic, geographic and demographic characteristics. Even though all 
regions enjoyed economic growth since 1978, the growth experience is not 
homogeneous. In Figure 2, the red line is the unweighted average real output growth 
rate across the 30 provinces and municipalities from 1979 to 2013.4 The blue bar is 
the 95% confidence interval for the real output growth rate in each year. Figure 2 
immediately reveals two messages. First, the post-1978 growth experience is uneven 
across regions in China as the 95% confidence intervals are widely spread in most 
years. Second, since the mid-1990s, there seems to be a convergence in terms of the 
growth rate of real output across regions over time as the blue bars became narrower 
during this later period. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 together suggest notable changes in both the cyclical pattern of total 
government spending and regional variation of real output growth in China since the 
4 We exclude Tibet from this analysis to be consistent with empirical estimations in this study. 
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 mid-1990s. What can explain such pronounced changes? To answer this question, we 
will discuss the relevant policy background during this period in Section 2.2. 
 
Figure 1: Total budgetary government spending and GDP growth 
 
 
Figure 2: Regional variation in real GDP growth 
 
2.2 The 1994 fiscal reform 
 
Since the reform and opening-up of the economy in 1978, China has gone through a 
series of fiscal reforms. The period between 1978 and 1994 could be described as a 
period of “fiscal decentralization” (Wong et al., 1993; Qian and Weingast, 1997).5 
Starting from the mid-1980s, a fiscal contracting system between central and 
5 Zhang and Zou (1998) point out that decentralization in China during this period is a more accurate 
description for budgetary than extra-budgetary government spending, and there are considerable 
variations across provinces in terms of the degree of budgetary decentralization. 
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 provincial governments was implemented. 6 During this period, a provincial 
government usually contracted with the central government on the total amount of tax 
revenue to be remitted to the central government. Once the agreed “quota” was met, 
the provincial government could keep the rest (Bahl and Wallich, 1992; Oi, 1992; 
Montinola, Qian, and Weingast, 1997). The total amount to be remitted from the 
provinces to the central government was often set ad hoc and usually lasted for 3-5 
years.7 
 
Fiscal decentralization during the early economic reform period is believed to have 
provided strong incentives for provincial governments to develop their economy (Oi, 
1992; Blanchard and Shleifer, 2000; and Jin, Qian, and Weingast, 2005). Nevertheless, 
this system also created incentive distortions. For example, provincial governments 
now had the incentives to avoid remittance to the central government by means such 
as growing their off-budgetary accounts (Oi, 1992). Together with the declining 
profits of state-owned enterprises during this period8, such reaction of the local 
governments to the fiscal contracting system led to a dramatic decline in two ratios: 
the ratio of total government revenue to GDP, and the ratio of central government 
revenue to total government revenue. As shown in Figure 3, the percentage of central 
government revenue in total government revenue increased initially during the early 
1980s but declined from around 40% in the mid-1980s to around 20% in 1993. 
 
The fiscal contracting system implemented in the 1980s may also have introduced a 
procyclical bias to the fiscal system (Bahl and Wallich, 1992). As provincial 
governments only needed to remit a more or less constant level of revenue to the 
central government in most cases, revenue realized by provincial governments tended 
to increase rapidly with economic growth. Consequently, provincial government 
spending also tended to increase substantially in a booming year, given the balanced 
budget requirement. In contrast, central government revenue tended to be more stable 
regardless of the underlying economic growth.  
 
In 1994, the Chinese government carried out a significant fiscal reform which 
replaced the fiscal contracting system implemented in the 1980s by a new tax 
revenue-sharing system. The 1994 fiscal reform aimed to address the fiscal decline of 
the central government and to revamp the old central-local fiscal relations (Wong, 
2000). As well documented in existing studies, the 1994 fiscal reform changed the 
fiscal relations between the central and the provincial governments in many aspects.  
 
Firstly, the reform set formal rules for allocating tax revenue between central and 
6  In the rest of the paper, we will use “provincial” government and “local” government 
interchangeably.  
7 Oi (1992) and Balh and Wallich (1992) provide detailed explanations for this sharing system during 
the 1980s. 
8 Taxation on the state-owned enterprises was the most important source of revenue for the central 
government during this 1980s. 
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 provincial governments that applied to all provinces. There are tax revenues wholly 
owned by the central government, tax revenues wholly owned by the provincial 
government, and others shared between the central and the provincial government. 
Instead of remitting a fixed level of tax revenue to the central government, now the 
central government could share a fixed percentage of certain types of tax revenues.9 
Consequently, as shown in Figure 3, the 1994 fiscal reform significantly strengthened 
the fiscal capacity of the central government. The ratio of central government 
budgetary revenue in total government budgetary revenue jumped from 22% in 1993 
to 55.7% in 1994 and it remains at around 50% ever since. In contrast, as Figure 4 
reveals, there is a gradual process of decentralization on the expenditure side since the 
early 1980s. Strikingly, by 2013 only around 15% of total budgetary spending was 
conducted by the central government, which makes China probably one of the most 
decentralized countries in the world in terms of government spending.10 
 
Figure 3: Central government revenue (% of total government revenue, 
1978-2013) 
 
  
9 Appendix A reports the categories of taxes and the associated revenue sharing rules between the 
central and the provincial government. 
10 This is not the same regarding government tax revenue as both tax rates and tax bases are set by the 
central government. 
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Figure 4: Central government expenditure (% of total government expenditure, 
1978-2013) 
 
Re-centralization of revenue combined with decentralization of expenditure implies 
fiscal imbalances across the different tiers of government. Figure 5 illustrates the 
evolution of the average provincial government fiscal gap, defined as 
(Expenditure-Revenue)/Expenditure, during the period 1978-2013.11 It shows that 
provincial governments ran a surplus during the early 1980s and more or less 
maintained a fiscal balance in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, after 1994 
provincial tax revenue could only finance around 40%-50% of local expenditures, 
suggesting that a substantial proportion of local spending had to be financed by other 
sources. 
Figure 5: Local government fiscal gap 1978-2013 
 
 
Secondly, the 1994 fiscal reform expanded the value-added tax to cover all 
manufacturing industries and it became an important source of revenue for the 
Chinese government since then. Although VAT was collected before 1994, the nature 
of the pre-1994 VAT was different from that of VAT implemented since 1994. 
Regardless of this difference, Figure 6 indicates that the VAT generated less than 10% 
of total tax revenue for the total government in 1985.This share increased to around 
11 We calculate the fiscal gap for each province in each year and then average this ratio across 
provinces to construct the time-series in Figure 5. 
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 20% by 1993. VAT revenue increased to around 45% of total tax revenue for total 
government in 1994. Since then its share has declined slightly but it remains an 
important revenue source. 
 
 
Thirdly, intergovernmental transfers and grants became a key instrument to finance 
provincial government spending after the 1994 fiscal reform. Figure 5 indicates that 
around 40-50 percent of provincial government expenditure needed to be financed by 
sources other than local tax revenue, and the majority of these non-tax sources of 
funds are in the form of transfers and grants from the central government since 1994. 
Although they existed well before 1994, intergovernmental transfers and grants 
played a much less important role in provincial government budgetary spending then, 
which is perhaps not surprising given the much deprived fiscal capacity of the central 
government during the 1980s. Since 1994, the role of intergovernmental transfers is 
particularly important for Chinese local government, considering that provinces and 
municipalities cannot independently issue debt to finance their investment.12 
 
Intergovernmental transfers and grants take three different forms in China: general 
transfers, earmarked transfers, and tax rebates. General transfers are mainly used to 
reduce fiscal disparities across provinces and to ensure equal access to basic public 
services in each region. A further breakdown of data suggests that around 35-40% of 
general transfers come in the form of fiscal equalization payments. Wang and Herd 
(2013) provide the formula for fiscal equalization in China, which depends on: 1) the 
gap between the standardized expenditure and revenue for each province;13 2) the 
12Very recently this restriction was relaxed for a few selected cities. Nevertheless, local government 
can effectively borrow to finance its budgetary spending via the central government, but only a small 
percentage of local expenditure is financed in this way. Local government also borrows via channels 
such as a Local Government Financing Vehicle (LGFV), but borrowing via the LGFVs is mainly to 
finance off-budgetary infrastructure investment (see, Zhang and Barnett, 2014). 
13 Standardized spending is the sum of total standardized spending for 14 sectors. For each sector, the 
standard national average standard expenditure per registered inhabitant is calculated. The national 
average is then converted to a provincial average by adjusting for cost differences caused by the 
difference from the national average of altitude, population density, temperature, transport distances, 
the number of civil servants, regional wage differentials, number of students and the prevalence of 
minority groups. The cost factors vary according to the spending category. Total standardized spending 
was calculated as the product of standardized spending per registered inhabitant and the number of 
0
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Figure 6: Percentage of VAT in total tax revenue 
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 gap between the actual expenditure and revenue for each province; 3) and the total 
equalization grant available in the budget year. Earmarked transfers are used to 
subsidize local projects in certain areas subject to matching outlays by local 
government. Tax rebates are tax revenues given back by the central-government to 
provinces based on rules set after 1994 to compensate local government for the loss of 
tax revenue due to the reform. Tax rebates and earmarked transfers were more 
important forms of intergovernmental transfers immediately after the 1994 fiscal 
reform. In more recent years the central government has been trying to increase the 
relative importance of general transfers. With available information at the provincial 
level, we calculate that tax rebates were about 10% of total transfers, and the figures 
are 50% and 40% for general purpose transfers and earmarked transfers respectively 
in the year 2013. 
 
We obtain time series data for the share of earmarked transfers in total balance 
revenue at the prefecture level during the period 1996-2009.14 More specifically, we 
aggregate the earmarked transfers and total balance revenue across prefectures within 
each province, and then divide the sum of earmarked transfers by the sum of total 
balance revenue for each province in each year. We then plot the averages and the 
standard deviations of this ratio across provinces in Figure 7 during 1996-2009. We 
only analyze the earmarked transfers as data is often missing for tax rebates and 
general purpose transfers. Figure 7 shows a general upward trend in the percentage of 
earmarked transfers in total balance revenue during this period, although there are 
considerable variations across provinces. It is also worth mentioning that although 
certain types of earmarked transfers require matching from the provincial 
governments, the way of matching is usually determined by the central government in 
China. Even though the way of matching is likely to be subject to bargaining between 
the central and provincial governments, provincial governments probably have much 
less power in this bargaining process. 
  
registered inhabitants. For each type of tax, standard tax revenue is determined by multiplying the 
standard tax base with the standard tax rate (Wang and Herd, 2013). 
14 Here, total balance revenue refers to the sum of tax rebates, general purpose transfers, earmarked 
transfers, and loans from national debt. We do not have similar time-series data at the provincial level. 
Overall revenue at the prefecture level is total balance revenue plus budgetary revenue. The latter 
includes all tax revenue. As breakdowns of transfers are not available at the province level but 
available at the prefecture level, we use aggregate earmarked transfers across prefectures as an 
approximation to the total amount of earmarked transfers a province receives. 
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Figure 7: The ratio of earmarked transfers to total balance revenue 1996-2009 
 
 
It is worth noting that although we focus on the budgetary account in this study, there 
are three different types of accounts at each level of Chinese government: the 
budgetary account, the government-managed fund, and the extra-budgetary account.15 
Intergovernmental transfers are more important to the budgetary account than to the 
other two. Data is difficult to gather in particular regarding the government-managed 
fund. Take the year 2010 for example when data is available, the figures from the 
three accounts for local government expenditures (aggregated over provinces) are: 
7,388, 3,167, and 536.8 billion RMB, respectively. This implies 66% of the local 
expenditure comes from the budgetary account, 28% from the government-managed 
fund, and 6% from the extra-budgetary account. In 2010, 44% of total local budgetary 
expenditure was financed by transfers from the central government. In contrast, only 
around 15% of expenditure from the local government-managed fund is financed by 
central government transfers. Extra-budgetary accounts do not involve 
central-provincial transfers as they are left to each province alone. 
 
To summarize, the 1994 fiscal reform significantly changed the central-local 
government fiscal relations in China as discussed in this section. Despite a large body 
of studies on the consequences of the 1994 fiscal reform, it is somewhat surprising 
that little has been said about its impact on the cyclicality of fiscal policies. We 
observe in Figure 1 that total government spending seems to be less procyclical since 
the mid-1990s, which coincides with the fiscal reform. This leads to our hypothesis 
that the 1994 fiscal reform reduced the procyclicality of government spending. In 
particular, the replacement of the fiscal contracting system by the revenue sharing 
15 There is no clear distinction between capital account and operating account in China. For example, 
infrastructure investment could be included in all three accounts. On the revenue side, all tax revenues 
go into the budgetary account. 
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 system, the adjustment of the tax revenue structures, and the increasing importance of 
the intergovernmental transfers and grants for local government financing could be 
the underlying factors that helped reduce the procyclicality of fiscal policies. 
 
3.  Cyclicality of government spending: time-series analysis 
 
In this section, we analyze the cyclicality of government spending using aggregate 
time-series data. Although estimations based on short time series may produce 
inaccurate results, one advantage of conducting the time-series analysis is that we can 
directly investigate whether the cyclicality of local government spending affects the 
cyclicality of overall government spending. To measure the cyclicality of government 
spending, we follow the specification in Lane (2005) and estimate Equation 1:16 
 (1)  ∆ ln𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
In Equation 1, the dependent variable is the first-difference of the natural logarithm of 
real government expenditures, and the explanatory variable is the first-difference of 
the natural logarithm of real GDP. We obtain nominal government expenditure and 
nominal GDP for the period 1978-2013 from the China Statistics Yearbooks.17We use 
the GDP deflator, provided by the World Bank, to convert these nominal time-series 
into real terms. Detailed variable definitions and data sources are provided in 
Appendix B. We estimate Equation 1 controlling for heteroskedasticity in the error 
term.18 
 
Taking the whole period 1978-2013 together, Table 1 indicates that total government 
expenditure in China during this period is procyclical.19 The estimated coefficient 𝛽𝛽 
is around 0.40, although it is associated with a large standard error. In contrast, the 
estimated 𝛽𝛽 regarding central government spending is negative and with a magnitude 
of around -0.86. Interestingly, local government spending is highly procyclical--the 
estimated 𝛽𝛽 is around 1.25 and is statistically significant. These estimates show that 
the procyclicality of local government spending tends to offset the counter-cyclicality 
of central government spending, which is not surprising given that expenditure is 
highly decentralized in China. 
16 One alternative method is to regress the cyclical component of government spending on the cyclical 
component of GDP. The cyclical components of these variables can be obtained by applying filters 
such as the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. We obtain similar results when using this alternative strategy. 
17Government spending does not include net lending. However, this figure contains interest payment on 
domestic debt since 2002. We do not adjust the spending figures for interest payment because we do 
not have this information for local and central government. In a separate exercise, we obtain figures for 
interest payment on domestic debt for total government from the China Fiscal Yearbooks and adjust the 
total government spending series from 2002 accordingly. The growth rates of real total government 
spending based on the unadjusted and the adjusted data, however, are almost identical.  
18In separate exercises, we also control for serial correlations in the error term and the results are not 
much affected. 
19We exclude the year 1994 from the regression analysis as there were substantial changes in the 
growth rate of government expenditure and revenue in this year due to the fiscal reform. Including the 
year 1994 will hence bias our estimation results. 
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We obtain more interesting results once we split the whole sample period into two 
sub-samples, the period before the 1994 reform, and the post-1994 period. First, we 
find that total government spending in China before 1994 was pro-cyclical, which was 
mainly driven by the strong procyclicality of local government spending during this 
period. In contrast, after 1994, total government spending became counter-cyclical. 
On the one hand, central government spending became somehow more 
counter-cyclical post the reform. On the other hand and perhaps more importantly, 
local government spending was highly procyclical before the reform but became 
acyclical or weakly counter-cyclical post the reform.20 
 
Can the observed changes in the cyclicality of government spending before and after 
the 1994 fiscal reform be explained by changes in the cyclicality of government 
revenue? To investigate this possibility, we replace real government expenditure with 
real government revenue on the left-hand side of Equation 1.The estimation results 
are summarized in the last three columns of Table 1. Unsurprisingly, total government 
revenue is procyclical as tax bases move in the same direction as output. Central 
government revenue growth is negatively correlated with GDP growth before 1994. 
This puzzling result could be explained by the deterioration of profits of state-owned 
enterprises during this period that contributed to the declining central government 
revenue. It could also be explained by the fact that local governments attempted to 
avoid remittance to the central government during the decentralization period, despite 
the phenomenal economic growth. In fact, as the central government gained a much 
stronger fiscal position after the 1994 fiscal reform, we observe its revenue to move in 
the same direction with GDP as it should be. Local government revenue was highly 
procyclical both before and after the 1994 reform. Although the magnitude of the 
estimated revenue elasticity with respect to GDP is smaller for the post-reform period, 
the change is not statistically significant. Therefore, based on these time-series 
estimations, there is no strong evidence that changes on the revenue side have led to 
the reduced procyclicality of local government spending.21 
 
To test formally whether the change in the cyclicality of government spending before 
and after the 1994 fiscal reform is statistically significant, we estimate Equation 2 as 
below: 
 (2)  ∆ ln𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 +  𝛼𝛼0∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝛼1𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 × ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
20 It is worth noting that in their cross-country study on graduation from fiscal pro-cyclicality, Frankel 
et al. (2013) classified China as “still in school”. Using the GFS data provided by the International 
Monetary Fund, they find a positive correlation between the cyclical component of government 
spending and that of the real GDP during the period 2000-2009. However, the government spending 
figures in their study include general government net lending, which is not included in the government 
spending figures we use. In a separate exercise using the GFS data, we find that general government 
net lending in China is procyclical during 2000-2009 but budgetary spending is not, which suggests 
their conclusion is likely driven by the procyclicality of government net lending.   
21 As we will show later, there is much stronger evidence that local government revenue became less 
procyclical after 1994 when we use provincial panel data and control for region-specific time trends.  
13 
 
                                                             
  
where POST is a dummy variable that equals 1 after the 1994 fiscal reform, and 0 
otherwise. In Columns 1-3, we estimate Equation 2 without additional control 
variables. In Columns 4-6, we control for the percentage change of trade openness 
and total government deficit (with a one-year lag) as in Alesina and Tabellini 
(2008).Trade openness is defined as the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP. 
Total government deficit is defined as (Total government expenditure-Total 
government revenue)/GDP. The patterns are similar with or without these additional 
control variables. Table 2 reveals that both total government and local government 
spending became less procyclical post the 1994 fiscal reform, and the change, as 
captured by 𝛼𝛼2, is statistically significant. Central government spending became 
somewhat more counter-cyclical post the 1994 reform, but not as significantly as for 
local government spending. 
  
    4. Analysis based on provincial panel data 
 
4.1. Cyclicality of local government spending: benchmark results 
 
To further investigate the cyclicality of local government spending, we now turn to 
provincial panel data during the period 1978-2013.22 The analysis based on aggregate 
time-series data provides us with an overview regarding the cyclicality of local 
government spending with respect to the nationwide business cycles (or symmetric 
output shocks). However, it is not clear whether local government spending would 
respond to local or nationwide business cycles. This highlights one limitation of the 
time-series analysis. With provincial level panel data, we are able to distinguish 
between region-specific output fluctuations (asymmetric shocks) and nationwide 
fluctuations (symmetric shocks). Specifically, we estimate the cyclicality of Chinese 
provincial government spending with respect to both province-specific and 
nationwide output fluctuations based on Equation 3:23 
 (3)∆ ln𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1[∆ln𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡]  + 𝛼𝛼2∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
where 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  and𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 are the real government budgetary expenditure and real 
output in province i in year t, respectively. 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 is the province-specific fixed effect, 
and 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 is the time effect. Provincial nominal government expenditures and output 
data are obtained from the China Fiscal Statistics Yearbooks. To transform the 
nominal expenditure and output data into real terms, we use province-specific output 
deflators. 24  In Equation 3, 𝛼𝛼1 captures the elasticity of provincial government 
spending towards province-specific output shocks, while𝛼𝛼2 captures the elasticity of 
22 We exclude Tibet from our regression analysis as data for Tibet is missing for many years. 
23 In Appendix C, we investigate the time-series properties of local government expenditures, revenues, 
and net transfers. We find that the levels of these variables are likely to be non-stationary but the 
first-differences of these variables are all stationary. 
24 The results are very similar when we use national GDP deflator as the common deflator for all 
provinces. 
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 provincial government spending towards nationwide shocks.  
 
In Table 3, we report the sub-period estimations based on Equation 3 in Columns 1 
and 2.25 In these two columns, we do not control for the time effect. First, we find 
that provincial government spending in China was strongly procyclical with respect to 
both province-specific and nationwide output fluctuations prior to the 1994 fiscal 
reform. However, local government spending became less procyclical with respect to 
local business cycles, and became acyclical towards nationwide GDP fluctuation after 
1994. In Column 3, we test whether the estimated cyclicality of provincial 
government spending before and after 1994 is statistically different. To do so, we 
interact the dummy variable POST with ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡. We include these 
two interaction terms together with the dummy variable itself as additional 
explanatory variables in Equation 3. We report the estimation result using the full 
sample (excluding the year 1994) in Column 3. The result indicates that local 
government spending became significantly less procyclical with respect to both 
asymmetric and symmetric shocks after 1994. 
 
In Columns 4-6, we repeat the estimations as in Columns 1-3 but controlling for a 
common linear time trend.26We further control for province-specific linear trends in 
Columns 7-9. The results in these alternative specifications remain similar to those in 
Columns 1-3. 
 
4.2. Cyclicality of local government revenue 
 
Could the changes in the cyclicality of local government spending be explained by 
changes on the revenue side? Table 4 reports the estimated cyclicality of provincial 
government revenue before and after the 1994 fiscal reform, using specifications 
similar to those in Table 3.More specifically, we replace ∆ ln𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 as the dependent 
variable in Equation 3, and estimate it without any linear trend, with a common linear 
trend, or with province-specific linear trends.  
 
Table 4 suggests that post the 1994 reform, local government revenue became less 
procyclical with respect to both local and nationwide output fluctuations. The 
reduction in the estimated revenue elasticity with respect to output is most substantial 
when we control for province-specific linear trends (Columns 6-9). It is worth noting 
that even in these specifications, local government revenue remains procyclical with 
respect to output as they should be. Mechanically, a reduction in local government 
revenue procyclicality would translate into less procyclical local government 
spending after 1994, if everything else is unchanged. 
 
 
25 We test the time-series properties of relevant variables in Appendix C. 
26 We include two linear trends in Column 6 to capture potential structure breaks. Provincial-specific 
trends are included in separate exercises and similar results are found. 
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 4.3. The role of intergovernmental transfers 
 
In a fiscal federation, central government can affect the cyclicality of local 
government spending via the intergovernmental transfer system. Previous studies find 
somewhat mixed evidence for whether intergovernmental transfers attenuate or 
amplify the procyclicality of sub-national government spending. For example, 
Sorenson, Wu, and Yosha (2001) find that intergovernmental grants in the United 
States are counter-cyclical with respect to state-specific business cycles. However, 
they find grants to be more generous during US nationwide upturns. Arena and 
Revilla (2009) find that intergovernmental transfers in Brazil are acyclical with 
respect to state-specific shocks but similar to Sorenson, Wu, and Yosha (2001), they 
find transfers in Brazil to be procyclical with respect to nationwide business cycles. 
Other studies which do not explicitly control for nationwide output shocks (Rodden 
and Wibbels, 2010; Végh and Vuletin, 2013; Blöchliger and Égert, 2013; and Seitz, 
2000) find intergovernmental transfers and grants to be procyclical with respect to 
region-specific shocks, although these results may be biased due to the omission of 
the nationwide output shocks (Sorenson, Wu, and Yosha, 2001). 
 
Intergovernmental transfers could be procyclical in reality for many reasons. For 
example, if the intergovernmental transfers take the form of matching grant, they 
would be procyclical as local government spending itself is often procyclical. 
Procyclical intergovernmental transfers can also occur if there is some arrangement 
about tax revenue sharing, as tax revenue tends to be highly procyclical. Fiscal 
equalization transfers could be destabilizing for poorer local governments if grant 
levels are determined by the difference between a local government’s fiscal capacity 
and the national average as in Germany, for instance (Bargain et al., 2013). In such a 
system, if the economy is hit by a symmetric shock, net recipients in the system could 
suffer from declines in both their own revenue and transfers from the equalization 
system. Political factors can also lead to procyclical transfers and grants as explained 
by Rodden and Wibbels (2010): as the central government is more willing to allocate 
money into areas where it can claim direct credit, it is less likely to increase transfers 
to local government during the downturns when the central government’s own budget 
becomes tight. 
 
Turning to the Chinese experience, we report in Table 5 the estimated cyclicality of 
real net transfers at the provincial level with respect to region-specific and nationwide 
output fluctuations. We collected nominal data for net transfers from the China Fiscal 
Statistics Yearbooks, which is only available from 1995 onwards.27 We then convert 
these nominal figures into real ones using province-specific output deflators. In 
Columns 1-3, we conduct estimations with different time effects. We find that net 
transfers are strongly counter-cyclical with respect to nationwide output 
27 Intergovernmental transfers and grants did exist before 1994, but they were much less important to 
local government financing then. 
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 fluctuations—the estimated coefficient on ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 is negative and statistically 
significant in all columns, and the magnitude of the point estimate (in absolute value) 
is large. There is much weaker evidence, however, that real net transfers are 
counter-cyclical with respect to province-specific shocks as the estimated coefficient 
on [∆ln𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡]is negative but not statistically significant.  
 
4.4. Robustness checks 
 
Our estimation results so far suggest that local government spending in China became 
dramatically less procyclical after the 1994 fiscal reform, which could be explained 
by less procyclical revenue and counter-cyclical intergovernmental transfers. One 
potential issue with the econometric specifications as Equation 3 is that we do not 
control for potential co-integration between variables. For example, if there is a 
long-run equilibrium relation between output and expenditure, ignoring such 
co-integration relation and simply estimate Equation 3 may lead to biased estimates. 
 
As a robustness check, we then estimate an error-correction model as Equation 4: 
 (4)∆ ln𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0+ 𝛼𝛼1[∆ln𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡]  + 𝛼𝛼2∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 + θ[ln𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
− 𝛽𝛽1�ln𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 − ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� − 𝛽𝛽2ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1] + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
where 𝛽𝛽1 and 𝛽𝛽2 measure the long-run relations between government spending, 
provincial output (relative to the national GDP), and total GDP. If there exist 
co-integrated relations between these variables, the estimated 𝛽𝛽1 and 𝛽𝛽2 would be 
statistically different from zero. Moreover,θ measures the convergence speed of 
government spending towards the equilibrium level. 𝛼𝛼1 and 𝛼𝛼2 continue to capture 
the short-run dynamics. 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 is a linear trend and we allow its coefficient to differ 
across provinces in some specifications. 
 
We can estimate Equation 4 restricting all the parameters to be the same across 
provinces using the OLS estimator. Nevertheless, there is no reason to impose the 
same long-run and short-run dynamics on different provinces. As further robustness 
checks of our benchmark results, we estimate Equation 4 using the Pooled 
Mean-group and the unweighted Mean-group estimators (Pesaran, Shin, and Smith, 
1999; Pesaran and Smith, 1995). The PMG estimator restricts the long-run parameters 
in Equation 4 (𝛽𝛽1 and 𝛽𝛽2) to be the same across provinces while allowing the 
short-run parameters (𝛼𝛼1 and 𝛼𝛼2) the speed of convergence (θ) to differ.28 The MG 
estimator, on the other hand, allows all the short-run and long-run parameters to differ 
across provinces, and calculated the unweighted averages of these estimated 
coefficients. The MG estimator is most flexible among all specifications, but 
coefficients yielded are likely to be associated with large standard errors as the length 
of our panel data is short. 
28 We report the unweighted average coefficients for these parameters. 
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We estimate the short-run and long-run elasticities of local government spending, 
revenue, and intergovernmental transfers with respect to both local and national 
output fluctuations in Appendix D (Tables D.1-D.3). In all these tables, we allow for 
province-specific linear trends. The magnitude of the point estimates in these tables is 
sensitive to the estimators we use, but the general pattern of our benchmark results 
based on the pooled estimations remains unchanged. Focusing on the estimated 
short-run elasticities, we continue to find that both local government spending and 
revenue became less procyclical after the 1994 fiscal reform, and intergovernmental 
transfers are counter-cyclical with respect to nationwide output fluctuations. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
5.1. Why has local revenue become less procyclical? 
 
5.1.1. The effect of revenue structure changes 
 
We have observed that provincial government revenue became less procyclical after 
the 1994 fiscal reform, which could partly explain why provincial government 
spending in China also became less procyclical after 1994. The question is, what can 
explain the change in the estimated revenue elasticity? 
 
One explanation, as already mentioned in Section 2.2, is that the procyclicality bias 
due to the old fiscal contracting system was corrected since the old system was 
overhauled and replaced by the new revenue-sharing system: provinces can now only 
keep a fixed proportion of revenue shared with the central government instead of 
keeping any surplus exceeding the fixed quota. Another possible explanation is linked 
to the value-added tax (VAT). Unlike corporate profits, the base of VAT is likely to be 
less volatile. Therefore, shifting tax revenue towards VAT may reduce revenue 
elasticity. Even though all provinces adopted VAT after the 1994 fiscal reform, the 
importance of VAT in total tax revenue varies considerably across provinces, probably 
due to their different economic structures. For example, the percentage of VAT in total 
tax revenue averaged between 1995 and 2013 is 10% in Hainan and is 30% in Shanxi. 
This heterogeneity allows us to investigate the role of VAT for revenue cyclicality. 
More specifically, we separate provinces into two groups depending on whether the 
ratio of VAT in total tax revenue averaged between 1995 and 2013 in a certain 
province is above or below the corresponding national median (20.3%). We then 
estimate the elasticity of local government revenue based on Column 9 of Table 4 for 
the two groups in Columns 1-2 of Table 6, separately. We find that only provinces 
where VAT is used more intensively experienced significant reduction in the elasticity 
of revenue with respect to both local and national output fluctuations after the 1994 
fiscal reform. 
 
Alternatively, we calculate the average ratio of VAT in total tax revenue between 1995 
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 and 2013 for each province, and then interact this ratio with [∆ln𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡] 
and ∆ ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, respectively. We then estimate the cyclicality of tax revenue post 
1994 including these interaction terms. The result is reported in Column 3. The 
estimated coefficients on these additional interaction terms are negative, although 
only the estimated coefficient on the interaction with national GDP growth is 
statistically significant. The result provides further evidence that tax revenue became 
less procyclical, in particular with respect to the nationwide output fluctuations, if 
VAT is a more important source of tax revenue for the local government. 
 
5.1.2 The effect of privatization 
 
An alternative explanation for the reduced revenue procyclicality observed in the data 
is related to the privatization process of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). There 
could be a link between privatization and the cyclicality of revenue for the following 
reason. Profits remittance and income taxes from the SOEs were the most important 
source of revenue for Chinese local government in the 1980s. Since the opening-up of 
the economy in 1978, however, SOEs suffered from losses and many had to rely on 
government subsidies. Government subsidies to loss-making SOEs are counted as 
negative revenue in the budgetary account, and this item is likely to be highly 
procyclical.29 As the privatization process went on through the 1990s and early 2000s, 
many SOEs were shut down which may lead to a smaller percentage of government 
subsidies (in absolute values) in total budgetary revenue. Mechanically, this 
contributed to the reduction in the procyclicality of local revenue. 
 
Nevertheless, if revenue became less procyclical because of privatization, we should 
not observe a structural change before and after the 1994 fiscal reform as privatization 
in China is a gradual process starting as early as in the 1980s. To test the effect of 
privatization, we construct two proxies. To capture the scale of privatization, we 
calculate employment in SOEs as a ratio in total employment for each province 
(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸_𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ). During the sample period, the average 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸_𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸  across provinces 
decreased from almost 100% in 1978 to around 88% in 1993 and to only around 18% 
in 2013. To test whether government subsidies to loss-making enterprises affect the 
elasticity of government revenue towards output fluctuations, we divide the number of 
loss-making enterprises by the total number of enterprises (𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡).30 We then include 
the first differences of these two ratios as additional explanatory variables when 
estimating the elasticity of government revenue towards output fluctuations. Table 7 
reports the results.31 
 
In Column 1, we include the first difference of the ratio of SOE employment in total 
29 This is to say that government subsidies to the SOEs in absolute values are counter-cyclical. 
30 Ideally, we would like to calculate the ratio of loss-making SOEs. However, we do not observe this 
due to lack of such data at the provincial level for sufficient long time series. 
31 The sample size is smaller in Table 8 compared to other tables. This is because we do not have 
information on state-sector employment and loss-making enterprises for certain provinces and for 
certain years. 
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 employment (∆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸_𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡). We do not find this additional variable to carry any 
significant explanatory power for the growth rate of local government revenue—the 
estimated coefficient on ∆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸_𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡is negative but insignificant. More importantly, 
including ∆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸_𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡does not affect the estimated revenue cyclicality in Column 1. 
In Column 2, we add the first difference of the ratio of loss-making enterprises in total 
enterprises (∆𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡), and we find that this variable does not carry any additional 
explanatory power either. Adding these two variables at the same time (Column 3) 
does not change the estimated revenue cyclicality. In Columns 4 and 5, we test 
whether the role of VAT would be affected if we control for the effect of privatization. 
We did so by repeating the exercises in Columns 3 and 4 in Table 7 while controlling 
for privatization. In Columns 4 and 5, we continue to find that provinces where VAT 
is used more intensively experienced a more substantial reduction in the procyclicality 
of local government revenue. 
 
5.1.3 Summary 
 
To summarize, in this section we attempt to explain why local government revenue 
became less procyclical in China after the 1994 fiscal reform. While the tax-sharing 
system corrected the procyclical bias in the old central-local fiscal relations, we find 
that changes of the tax revenue structures due to the increasing importance of the 
value-added tax also helped reducing the procyclicality of government revenue. In 
contrast, we do not find any evidence that privatization contributed to the reduced 
procyclicality of local government revenue. 
 
5.2. Do intergovernmental transfers help smooth region-specific output 
fluctuations? 
 
As we observe from Table 5, intergovernmental transfers in China after 1994 are 
strongly counter-cyclical with respect to nationwide GDP fluctuations. This means 
that provinces would receive fewer transfers from the central government if the 
national economy is in a better state, and vice versa. This finding is in contrast to 
previous studies on the United States and other OECD countries. However, we do not 
find strong evidence that intergovernmental transfers in China are counter-cyclical 
towards province-specific output shocks. The second finding, though, is based on 
regressions where we treat all provinces as the same. This approach neglects that the 
extent to which provinces rely on intergovernmental transfers varies significantly 
across provinces.  
 
As one would expect, poorer provinces rely more on intergovernmental transfers to 
finance their spending—the ratio of net transfers in total local government spending is 
on average around 0.57 for poorer provinces and only around 0.36 for richer 
provinces. Poorer provinces also receive more transfers in the form of earmarked 
transfers than richer provinces—the average ratio of earmarked transfers in total 
balance revenue for poorer provinces is 0.39, compared with 0.20 for richer provinces. 
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 As earmarked transfers are likely to be more important as a tool of implementing 
discretionary fiscal policies compared with general purpose transfers, these 
observations suggest that grants might at least be counter-cyclical with respect to local 
cycles in poorer provinces.  
 
Could transfers be more counter-cyclical in poorer provinces? To clarify this issue, we 
estimate the cyclicality of intergovernmental transfers for two groups of provinces 
based on whether their real GDP per capita in 1994 was above or below the national 
median in that year. We report the results in Columns 1-2 of Table 8. We control for 
province-specific trends in these and all subsequent columns in Table 8. Net transfers 
are strongly counter-cyclical towards nationwide GDP fluctuations in both rich and 
poor provinces. Interestingly, we find that net transfers are also strongly 
counter-cyclical with respect to region-specific output fluctuations in poorer provinces, 
but they remain acyclical in richer provinces. 
  
To investigate the role of earmarked transfers, we conduct two exercises. In Columns 
3, we calculate the average ratio of earmarked transfers in total balance revenue for 
each province during the period 1996-2009 when the data is available, and then 
construct a dummy variable Above_Earmarked, which equals 1 if this average ratio in 
a certain province is above the national median.32 We then interact this dummy 
variable with both local and nationwide output fluctuations. Column 3 indicates that 
net transfers were only significantly counter-cyclical towards local cycles in provinces 
which received more earmarked transfers. Interestingly, earmarked transfers do not 
change the cyclicality of total net transfers towards nationwide cycles. Figure 7 
indicates an upward trend in the ratio of earmarked transfers in total balance revenue. 
As a robustness check, in Column 4 we construct a dummy variable Rank_Earmarked 
which equals 1 if the ratio of the earmarked transfers in total balance revenue in a 
certain province is above the national median level in a particular year. This dummy 
variable therefore may vary across years within a certain province. Consistent with 
Column 3, we find again that net transfers are counter-cyclical towards local cycles in 
provinces receiving more earmarked transfers. 
 
Findings in this section suggest that intergovernmental transfers in China, unlike what 
has been observed in many other countries, are strongly counter-cyclical towards 
nationwide economic fluctuations. On average, the transfer system does not help 
smooth regional output shocks. However, we find that net transfers are 
counter-cyclical in poorer provinces, which rely more heavily on transfers from the 
central government to finance local spending and receive a higher percentage of 
transfers in the form of earmarked transfers. 
 
 
 
32 Similar as in Figure 7, we use data aggregated over the prefectures within each provinces to 
construct the ratio of earmarked transfers in total balance revenue. 
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 5.3 Cyclicality of government spending and output volatility 
 
So far, we have established that government spending, especially at the provincial 
level, has become significantly less procyclical in China since the 1994 fiscal reform. 
One interesting issue is whether this change affects the volatility of output. 
Interestingly, we find that the standard deviation of the growth rate of real output, 
averaged across provinces, decreased from 0.05 in the pre-1994 period to around 0.02 
during the post-1994 period. There are many reasons for the reduced output volatility 
for a fast growing transitional economy like China, and it is beyond the scope of the 
current study to investigate all possible explanations. As a rather crude analysis, we 
investigate the correlation between the cyclicality of government spending and output 
volatility as follows. We first estimate the cyclicality of government spending towards 
both local and national cycles for each province during the period 1995-2013, 
controlling for a linear trend. We label the estimated cyclicality coefficients as 𝛼𝛼�𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖 
and 𝛼𝛼�𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖, respectively. We calculate the standard deviation of the growth rate of real 
output growth (𝜎𝜎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 94) for each province during the same period. 33 We then 
examine the relationship between the cyclicality of provincial government spending 
and output growth volatility in the spirit of Fetas and Mihov (2006). More specifically, 
we estimate Equation 5 as follows: 
 (5)ln(𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 94) = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝛼𝛼�𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝛼𝛼�𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
 
We report the OLS estimation result based on Equation 5 in Column 1 of Table 9.1. 
We find a positive and significant correlation between the cyclicality of government 
spending towards the nationwide output shocks and output volatility at the provincial 
level. In other words, provinces with more procyclical spending policies also appear 
to have experienced more volatile growth since the mid-1990s. We do not find any 
statistically significant association between the cyclicality of government spending 
towards local shocks and output volatility. 
 
As already discussed, the reduction in the cyclicality of provincial government 
spending is likely to be associated with both less procyclical revenue due to the 
introduction of the VAT and a vertical transfer system that was strongly 
counter-cyclical towards nationwide cycles. In Column 2, we regress ln(𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 94) on 
a dummy variable, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴_𝐴𝐴𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴_𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃, which equals 1 if a province use VAT more 
intensively (i.e., the share of VAT in total tax revenue, averaged across years, is above 
the national medium level). Interesting, we find that provinces using VAT more 
intensively appear to have less volatile output. In Column 3, we regress ln(𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 94) 
on a dummy variable 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴_𝐴𝐴𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 that equals 1 if a province relies more 
on transfers from the central government to finance spending (i.e., the share of 
transfers in local spending, averaged across years, is above the national medium level). 
33 Similar to the estimation of the cyclical pattern of spending, we first detrend the output growth data 
and then calculate the standard deviation of the detrended growth rate. 
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 We find that provinces that rely more on transfers tend to have less volatile output 
growth. In Column 4, we include both dummies and find that the transfer system has a 
stronger link to the output volatility. In Column 5, we include 𝛼𝛼�𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖, 𝛼𝛼�𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖, and the two 
dummy variables together as explanatory variables, and we only find a significant and 
negative association between output volatility and the dummy variable 
𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴_𝐴𝐴𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 , which could be explained if the dummy variable 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴_𝐴𝐴𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 absorbs the effect of 𝛼𝛼�𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖 on output volatility. 
 
We conduct a rather crude analysis about whether the output growth became less 
volatile since the mid-1990s is associated with less procyclical government spending. 
Specifically, we estimate Equation 6 as follows: 
 (5)ln(𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 94)−ln(𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 94) = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 ln(𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 94) + 𝛾𝛾1∆𝛼𝛼�𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2∆𝛼𝛼�𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
 
where ∆𝛼𝛼�𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼�𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 94 − 𝛼𝛼�𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 94 , and ∆𝛼𝛼�𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼�𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 94 − 𝛼𝛼�𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 94 . 𝛼𝛼�𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 94  and 
𝛼𝛼�𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 94 are the estimated cyclicality of provincial government spending with respect 
to nationwide and local cycles during the period 1979-1993. Table 9.2 reports the 
OLS regression result. Based on this crude analysis, it appears to be the case that 
provinces that became less procyclical in their fiscal policies since the mid-1990s also 
experienced more reduction in output volatility. But it is the decline in procyclicality 
with respect to national, not local cycles which goes along with less local output 
volatility.  
 
Caution is needed when interpreting results in this section as we do not deal with the 
endogeneity of the estimated cyclicality of government spending. To establish any 
causality, we need to use similar instrumental variables approaches as in Fetas and 
Mihov (2006), which we leave for future research. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have investigated the cyclicality of government spending in China. 
We start from the observation that public spending in many developing and emerging 
economies is notoriously procyclical. In fiscal federations, procyclicality of spending 
is particularly widespread at lower tiers of government. Studying the issue of 
spending cyclicality in China is interesting because China is both an emerging 
economy and a country with highly decentralized public spending.  
 
The main finding of our analysis is that provincial government spending in China 
since the mid-1990s is perhaps an exception to the usual pattern of procyclical fiscal 
policy found elsewhere. We argue that this is likely a consequence of the 1994 reform 
of intergovernmental fiscal relations in China. Before this reform provincial 
government spending was strongly procyclical. This pattern, however, changed after 
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 the reform. Yet, to graduate from procyclical fiscal policies, much improvement is still 
needed. While provincial spending in China is countercyclical with regard to 
nationwide business cycles, it is rather acyclical with respect to local cycles, which 
implies that it does not offer much insurance against asymmetric economic shocks. 
 
Findings of this paper suggest that the arrangement of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations could significantly affect the cyclicality of fiscal policies, especially in fiscal 
federations with decentralized government spending. Moreover, our findings suggest 
two important ways in which countries may tackle the issue of procyclical public 
spending at lower levels of government, which is an important matter in any fiscal 
federation: Firstly, by changing the structure of local tax revenues; and secondly, 
through a reform of the system of intergovernmental fiscal relations which reduces the 
dependence of local governments on local tax revenues. Our study provides new 
perspectives on how developing countries could escape from the “procyclicality trap”. 
 
Finally, it is interesting to relate this revenue smoothing property of the value added 
tax to the debate about the link between tax structures and growth. Previous literature 
suggests that tax structures matter for long-run economic growth (Arnold et al., 2010). 
For example, shifting tax revenue from income taxes towards consumption taxes may 
lead to higher long-run level of GDP per capita, as the latter are likely to be less 
distortive. Our results suggest a new mechanism through which tax structures would 
matter for growth. Since procyclical fiscal policies are likely to be harmful to 
economic growth, increasing the importance of consumption tax in total tax revenue 
may also benefit long-run growth by reducing the pro-cyclicality of government 
revenue and consequently, that of government spending. Of course, one may object 
that the lower cyclicality of the value-added tax reduces the automatic stabilisation 
properties of the tax system that is the tax burden declines less in economic downturns 
than in the case of more pro-cyclical tax sources. Which effect is more important – the 
smoothing of government spending or the reduction in automatic stabilisation on the 
tax side – is a matter for future research.  
 
 
References 
 
Abbott, Andrew, and Jones, Philip. (2012). “Intergovernmental transfers and 
procyclical public spending,” Economics Letters, Vol. 115, 447-451 
 
Aghion, Philippe and Marinescu, Ioana (2007). “Cyclical Budgetary Policy and 
Economic Growth: What Do We Learn from OECD Panel Data?” NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 22, 251-278 
 
Alesina, Alberto, and Tabellini, Guido (2008). “Why is fiscal policy often procyclical?” 
CESifo working papers, No. 1556 
 
24 
 
 Arena, Marco and Revilla, Julio E. (2009). “Pro-cyclical fiscal policy in Brazil: 
evidence from the states,” World BankPolicy Research Working Paper No. 5144. 
 
Bahl, Roy, and Wallich, Christine (1992). “Intergovernmental fiscal relations in 
China,” World Bank Working Paper No. 863 
 
Bargain, O., M. Dolls, C. Fuest, D. Neumann, A. Peichl. N. Pestel und S. 
Siegloch(2013). “Fiscal Union in Europe? Redistributing and Stabilising Effects of a 
European Tax Benefit System and Fiscal Equalisation Mechanism”, Economic Policy, 
Vol. 28, 375-422. 
 
Blanchard, Olivier, and Shleifer, Andrei (2000). “Federalism with and without 
political centralization: China versus Russia,” NBER Working Paper No. 7616, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 
 
Blöchliger, Hansjörg, and Égert, Balázs (2013). “Fiscal consolidation across 
government levels - Part 3. Intergovernmental grants, pro- or counter-cyclical?” 
OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 1072, OECD Publishing 
 
Brandt, Loren, and Zhu, Xiaodong (2000). “Redistribution in a decentralized 
economy: Growth and inflation in China under reform,” Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 108 (2), 422-439 
 
Clemens, Jeffery, and Miran, Stephen (2012). “Fiscal policy multipliers on 
subnational government spending,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 
Vol. 4(2), 46-68 
 
Fetas, Anotonio, and Mihov, Ilian (2006). “The macroeconomic effects of fiscal rules 
in the US states,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 90, 101–117 
 
Frankel, Jeffrey A., Vegh, Carlos A., and Vuletin, Guillermo (2013). “On graduation 
from fiscal procyclicality,” Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 100(1), 32–47 
 
Gavin, Michael and Roberto Perotti (1997). “Fiscal Policy in Latin America,” NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 
 
Gordon, Roger, and Wei Li (2013). “Provincial and Local Governments in China: 
Fiscal Institutions and Government Behavior,” Capitalizing China, edited by Joseph 
Fan and Randall Morck, 337 - 369 
 
Ilzetzki, Ethan, and Vegh, Carlos A. (2008). "Procyclical fiscal Policy in Developing 
Countries: Truth or Fiction?" NBER Working PapersNo. 14191, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Inc. 
 
25 
 
 Jin, Hehui, Qian, Yingyi, and Weingast, Barry R. (2005). “Regional decentralization 
and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 
89, 1719–1742 
 
Talvi, Ernesto, and Carlos A. Végh (2005). “Tax base variability and pro-cyclical 
fiscal policy in developing countries,” Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 78, 
156-190 
 
Lane, Philip R. (2003). “The cyclical behavior of fiscal policy: evidence from the 
OECD,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 87, 2661– 2675 
 
Montinola, Gabriella, Qian, Yingyi, and Weingast, Barry R. (1995). “Federalism, 
Chinese style: The political basis for economic success,” World Politics, Vol. 48(1), 
50-81 
 
Musgrave, Richard M. (1959). The Theory of Public Finance. NY: McGraw-Hill 
 
Oates, Wallace E. (1972). Fiscal Federalism. NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
 
Oates, Wallace E. (1999). “An essay on fiscal federalism,” Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. 37, 1120–49 
 
Oi, Jean C. (1992). “Fiscal reform and the economic foundations of local state 
corporatism in China,” World Politics, Vol. 45(1), 99-126 
 
Pesaran, M. Hashem, and Smith, Ron (1995). “Estimating long-run relationships from 
dynamic heterogeneous panel,” Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 68(1), 79-113 
 
Pesaran, M. Hashem, Shin, Yongcheol, and Smith, Ron (1999). “Pooled mean group 
estimation of dynamic heterogeneous panels,” Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, Vol. 94, 289-326 
 
Qian, Yingyi, and Weingast, Barry R. (1997). “Federalism as a commitment to 
preserving market incentives,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, 83-92 
 
Rodden, Jonathan, and Wibbels, Eric (2010). “Fiscal decentralization and the business 
cycle: An empirical study of eight federations,” Economics & Politics, Vol. 2, 37-67 
 
Roland, G. (1999). Politics, Markets, and Firms: Transition and Economics. MIT 
Press, Cambridge, MA 
 
Seitz, H. (2000). “Fiscal policy, deficits and politics of subnational governments: 
thecase of the German Laender,” Public Choice, Vol.102, 183–218 
 
26 
 
 Sorensen, Bent E., Wu, Lisa, and Yosha, Oved. (2001). “Output fluctuations and fiscal 
policy: U.S. state and local governments 1978-1994,” European Economic Review, 
Vol. 45, 1271-1310 
 
Wang, Xiao, and Herd, Richard. (2013). “The system of revenue sharing and fiscal 
transfers in China,” OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 1030, OECD 
 
Wong, C.P.W., Heady, C., and Woo, W.T. (1993). “Economic reform and fiscal 
management in China: Report of technical assistance project,” Asian Development 
Bank and Ministry of Finance of China 
 
Wong, C.P.W. (2000).  “Central-local Relations Revisited: the 1994 Tax Sharing 
Reform and Public Expenditure Management in China,” China Perspectives 
 
Zhang, Yuanyan Sophia Zhang, and Barnett, Steven (2014). “Fiscal vulnerabilities 
and risks from local government finance in China,” International Monetary Fund 
Working Paper No.14/4 
 
Zhang, and Zou, Hengfu. (1998). “Fiscal decentralization, public spending, and 
economic growth in China,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 67, 221–240  
  
27 
 
 Table 1: Times series analysis of the cyclicality of government expenditure and 
revenue with respect to national GDP growth rate: 1978-2013 
 Expenditure Revenue 
Period Total Central Local Total Central Local 
1978-2013 0.401 -0.864 1.253** 0.684 -0.332 0.981** 
 (0.517) (0.812) (0.612) (0.411) (0.933) (0.470) 
1978-1993 0.770 -0.365 1.679* 0.699 -0.572 1.025* 
 (0.496) (0.804) (0.790) (0.409) (1.258) (0.529) 
1995-2013 -0.823 -2.547* -0.176 0.695 0.545 0.898*** 
 (0.638) (1.310) (0.514) (0.651) (1.118) (0.269) 
Notes: The left-hand side of Table 1 reports the OLS estimate of the coefficient α in the time-series 
regression ∆ ln𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 = α + β∆ ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡. The right-hand side of Table 1 reports the OLS estimate 
of β as in∆ ln𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = α + β∆ ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡. Expenditure and revenue figures are in real terms. The 
year 1994 is excluded from the full sample estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 2: Changing cyclicality of government expenditure before and after the 
1994 fiscal reform: time-series analysis 
 
Without other control variables With other control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total Central Local Total Central Local 
              
∆ ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡  0.770 -0.365 1.679** 0.700 -0.440 1.619** 
 
(0.492) (0.797) (0.783) (0.448) (0.829) (0.748) 
𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃× ∆ ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 -1.593* -2.182 -1.855* -1.744** -2.342 -2.099** 
 
(0.809) (1.541) (0.939) (0.735) (1.548) (0.975) 
𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 0.241*** 0.291* 0.256*** 0.285*** 0.338** 0.322*** 
 
(0.079) (0.147) (0.091) (0.073) (0.158) (0.106) 
𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡   
   
0.086 0.090 0.185 
    
(0.074) (0.243) (0.172) 
𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1  
   
-0.038*** -0.041* -0.047*** 
    
(0.008) (0.022) (0.017) 
Constant -0.035 0.035 -0.099 -0.007 0.065 -0.073 
 
(0.052) (0.070) (0.076) (0.045) (0.074) (0.078) 
       Observations 34 34 34 34 34 34 
R-squared 0.497 0.271 0.404 0.657 0.357 0.568 
Notes: The year 1994 is excluded from the estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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 Table 3: Cyclicality of provincial government spending: within-groups estimations  
   Without trend  Common trend  Region-specific trend 
∆ ln𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 <1994 >1994 Full sample <1994 >1994 Full sample <1994 >1994 Full sample 
                    [∆ln𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 − ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡] 1.558*** 0.610*** 1.540*** 1.600*** 0.431** 1.581*** 1.637*** 0.015 1.591*** 
 
(0.092) (0.170) (0.090) (0.098) (0.174) (0.094) (0.096) (0.215) (0.108) 
∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 1.738*** -0.003 1.728*** 1.645*** -0.415** 1.634*** 1.666*** -0.533*** 1.640*** 
 
(0.173) (0.145) (0.169) (0.170) (0.185) (0.165) (0.175) (0.191) (0.178) 
𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 × [∆ln𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 − ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡] 
  
-0.878*** 
  
-1.080*** 
  
-1.284*** 
   
(0.196) 
  
(0.210) 
  
(0.252) 
𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 × ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡  
  
-1.720*** 
  
-2.029*** 
  
-2.090*** 
   
(0.252) 
  
(0.282) 
  
(0.303) 
𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 
  
0.248*** 
  
0.292*** 
  
0.300*** 
   
(0.026) 
  
(0.029) 
  
(0.032) 
Common trend No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Region-specific trend No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 449 570 1,019 449 540 989 449 540 989 
Number of groups 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.275 0.025 0.357 0.290 0.072 0.380 0.302 0.123 0.396 
Notes: The year 1994 is excluded from the estimation. Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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 Table 4: Cyclicality of provincial government revenue: within-groups estimations 
   Without trend  Common trend  Region-specific trend 
∆ ln𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 <1994 >1994 Full sample <1994 >1994 Full sample <1994 >1994 Full sample 
                    [∆ln𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡] 1.433*** 1.193*** 1.426*** 1.546*** 1.003*** 1.531*** 1.517*** 0.656* 1.525*** 
 
(0.113) (0.208) (0.112) (0.116) (0.200) (0.111) (0.129) (0.347) (0.138) 
∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 1.935*** 1.316*** 1.932*** 1.688*** 1.164*** 1.680*** 1.671*** 1.066*** 1.677*** 
 
(0.219) (0.173) (0.222) (0.197) (0.173) (0.200) (0.208) (0.208) (0.209) 
𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 × [∆ln𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡] 
  
-0.177 
  
-0.424* 
  
-0.798** 
   
(0.223) 
  
(0.215) 
  
(0.298) 
𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 × ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 
  
-0.603** 
  
-0.486* 
  
-0.591** 
   
(0.258) 
  
(0.245) 
  
(0.277) 
𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 
  
0.143*** 
  
0.200*** 
  
0.214*** 
   
(0.026) 
  
(0.031) 
  
(0.034) 
Common trend No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Region-specific trend No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 449 570 1,019 449 540 989 449 540 989 
Number of groups 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.191 0.133 0.311 0.266 0.164 0.366 0.302 0.223 0.400 
Notes: The year 1994 is excluded from the estimation. Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5: Cyclicality of intergovernmental transfers: within-groups estimations 
  (1) (2) (3) 
∆ ln𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 Without trend   Common trend Region-specific trend  
        [∆ln𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡] -0.331 -0.530 -0.456 
 
(0.307) (0.350) (0.475) 
∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 -1.371*** -1.597*** -1.564*** 
 
(0.206) (0.222) (0.241) 
Common trend No YES No 
Region-specific trend No No YES 
Observations 508 508 508 
Number of groups 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.026 0.032 0.055 
Notes: The sample covers 1995 onwards. Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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 Table 6: Revenue elasticity: the role of VAT (within-groups estimations) 
 
 
1979-2013 1995-2013 
 (1) (2) （3） 
∆ ln𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 Less VAT More VAT  
  
  
 [∆ln𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡] 1.498*** 1.549*** 1.904** 
 
(0.200) (0.183) (0.839) 
∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 1.706*** 1.645*** 3.060*** 
 
(0.211) (0.368) (0.555) 
𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 × [∆ln𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡] -0.437 -1.365***  
 
(0.375) (0.389)  
𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 × ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 -0.187 -1.122**  
 
(0.327) (0.445)  
𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 0.143*** 0.299***  
 
(0.033) (0.055)  
𝐴𝐴𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴_𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 × [∆ln𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡]   -3.700 
   (3.784) 
𝐴𝐴𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴_𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 × ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡   -8.672*** 
   (2.502) 
Constant -0.181*** -0.225*** 0.007 
 
(0.020) (0.039) (0.016) 
Region-specific trend Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 494 495 570 
R-squared 0.478 0.359  0.141 
Number of groups 15 15 30 
Notes: In Columns 1 and 2, we split provinces into two groups: those with average ratio of VAT in total 
tax revenue during 1995-2013 (Ave_VAT) below the corresponding national median (“Less VAT”), and 
those above it (“More VAT”). In Column 3, we interact the variable Ave_VAT with both nationwide and 
region-specific output fluctuations, and estimate the elasticity of revenue with respect to output during 
the period 1995-2013. Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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 Table 7: Revenue elasticity and privatization: 1979-2013 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
∆ ln𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 Full sample Full sample Full sample Less VAT More VAT 
            [∆ln𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 − ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡] 1.536*** 1.548*** 1.540*** 1.505*** 1.554*** 
 
(0.129) (0.132) (0.131) (0.175) (0.187) 
∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 1.516*** 1.520*** 1.494*** 1.314*** 1.624*** 
 
(0.218) (0.199) (0.208) (0.161) (0.366) 
𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 × [∆ln𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 − ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡] -1.064*** -1.023*** -1.052*** -0.616* -1.571*** 
 
(0.274) (0.273) (0.266) (0.314) (0.430) 
𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 × ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡  -0.229 -0.265 -0.223 0.418 -0.932* 
 
(0.310) (0.291) (0.309) (0.359) (0.465) 
𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 0.191*** 0.201*** 0.192*** 0.090* 0.292*** 
 
(0.041) (0.037) (0.041) (0.044) (0.060) 
∆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸_𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 -0.113 
 
-0.118 -0.262 -0.027 
 
(0.167) 
 
(0.169) (0.285) (0.172) 
∆𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
-0.044 -0.052 -0.102 -0.048 
  
(0.084) (0.088) (0.186) (0.097) 
Constant -0.195*** -0.196*** -0.193*** -0.151*** -0.224*** 
 
(0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.019) (0.039) 
Region-specific trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 910 910 910 441 469 
R-squared 0.400 0.400 0.401 0.522 0.349 
Number of groups 30 30 30 15 15 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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 Table 8: Are transfers more counter-cyclical in some provinces than others? 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
∆ ln𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 High GDP per capita  Low GDP per capita Full sample   Full sample 
          [∆ln𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡] 0.855 -1.273* 0.962 0.622 
 
(0.644) (0.595) (0.727) (0.547) 
∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 -1.422*** -1.684*** -3.286*** -3.423*** 
 
(0.370) (0.307) (0.476) (0.538) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴_𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 × [∆ln𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡]   -2.314**  
   (0.952)  
𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸_𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 × [∆ln𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡]    -1.501** 
    (0.614) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴_𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 × ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡   0.312  
   (0.699)  
𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸_𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 × ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡    -0.003 
    (0.988) 
∆𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸   0.140*  
   (0.077)  
𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸_𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸    0.040 
    (0.095) 
Region-specific trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 253 255 414 414 
No. of groups 15 15 30 30 
Notes: In Columns 1 and 2, we split the provinces into two groups: those with per capita GDP in 1994 
above the national median (“High GDP per capita”), and those below the national median (“Low GDP 
per capita”). In Columns 3, we calculate the average ratio of earmarked transfers in total balance 
revenue for each province and construct the dummy variable Above_Earmarked, which equals 1 if the 
average ratio in a certain province is above the national median. In Column 4, we construct the dummy 
variable Rank_Earmarked which equals 1 if the ratio of the earmarked transfers in total balance 
revenue in a certain province is above the national median level in a particular year. Robust clustered 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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 Table 9.1: Cyclicality of government spending and output volatility post 1994  
Dep. Variable:      
 ln (𝜎𝜎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 94) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
           
𝛼𝛼�𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖 0.136** 
   
0.058 
 
(0.049) 
   
(0.060) 
𝛼𝛼�𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖 -0.046 
   
-0.007 
 
(0.042) 
   
(0.043) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴_𝐴𝐴𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴_𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 
 
-0.222** 
 
-0.168 -0.144 
  
(0.108) 
 
(0.106) (0.113) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴_𝐴𝐴𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 
  
-0.302*** -0.268** -0.181* 
   
(0.100) (0.106) (0.103) 
Observations 30 30 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.259 0.132 0.244 0.317 0.356 
 
Table 9.2: Changes of government spending cyclicality and changes of output 
volatility 
  (1) 
Dep. Variable: ln(𝜎𝜎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 94) −  ln (𝜎𝜎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 94) 
    ln(𝜎𝜎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 94) 0.888*** 
 
(0.236) 
∆𝛼𝛼�𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖 0.077** 
 
(0.035) 
∆𝛼𝛼�𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖 -0.028 
 
(0.034) 
  Observations 30 
R-squared 0.379 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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 Appendices A-D 
 
Appendix A: Tax revenue sharing between central and local government (China 
Statistical Yearbook) 
 
 Sharing rules (%) % Total tax revenue 2012 
 Central Local Central Local 
Central taxes     
Consumption tax 100 0 14.77  
Tariffs 100 0 5.22  
Intl trade-related consumption tax and 
VAT 
100 0 27.77  
Refunds of VAT and consumption tax 100 0 -19.57  
Vehicle purchase tax 100 0 4.18  
Cargo tax 100 0 0.07  
Shared taxes     
VAT 75 25 36.9 14.24 
Corporate income tax 60 40 22.67 16.00 
Personal income tax 60 40 6.55 4.92 
Stamp tax on securities 97 3 5.52 0.02 
Sub-national taxes     
Business tax 1 99 0.38 32.85 
Resource tax 0 100  1.81 
Urban maintenance and development tax 0 100 0.36 6.20 
House property tax 0 100  2.90 
Urban land use tax 0 100  3.26 
Land appreciation tax 0 100  5.75 
Tax on vehicles and boat operation 0 100  0.83 
Tax on the use of arable land 0 100  3.43 
Tobacco tax 0 100  0.28 
Tax on deeds 0 100  6.07 
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 Appendix B: Variable definitions and data sources 
 
Ave_VAT: the ratio of the value-added tax revenue in total tax revenue, averaged 
across the post-1994 period (Zhongguo caizheng tongji nianjian) 
 
DEF: Total government deficit, defined as (Total government expenditure-Total 
government revenue)/GDP (China Statistical Yearbook) 
 
EXP: Real government spending. The nominal data is obtained from the Zhongguo 
caizheng tongji nianjian. The nominal data is the transformed into real one using 
province-specific deflators 
 
GDP: Real gross domestic product (China Statistical Yearbook). To transform the 
nominal GDP into real GDP, we use the GDP deflator provided by the World Bank 
 
GR_TOT: the growth rate of trade openness, which is defined as the sum of exports 
and imports divided by GDP (China Statistical Yearbook) 
 
GSP: Real provincial output (China Statistical Yearbook). To transform the nominal 
output into real ones, we use province-specific deflators 
 
Loss: the ratio of loss-making enterprises in total enterprises (China Statistical 
Yearbook) 
 
REV: Real government tax revenue (Zhongguo caizheng tongji nianjian) 
 
SOE_EMP: the ratio of SOEs’ employment in total employment (China Statistical 
Yearbook) 
 
TRANSFER: Real net transfers the local governments receive from the central 
government. It is defined as transfers from central government minus transfers to 
central government (Zhongguo caizheng tongji nianjian) 
 
POST: a dummy variable that equals 1 for the period 1995-2013, and 0 before 1994 
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 Appendix C: Time-series properties of key variables 
 
 <1994 >1994 
 Without T With T Without T With T 
In levels     ln𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 1.000 0.970 0.988 0.009 ln𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 1.000 0.023 1.000 0.458 ln𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅   1.000 0.001 
     
First difference     
∆ln𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
∆ln𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
∆ln𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅   0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table presents p-values from the Fisher-type test for unit roots in heterogeneous panels 
(Maddala and Wu, 1999). Suppose the stochastic process,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, is generated by an autoregressive process:  
∆𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 + �𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗∆𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
where t is a linear trend. The null hypothesis is 𝐻𝐻0: 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 = 0 for for i, and the alternative is𝐻𝐻1: 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 <0, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2, …𝑇𝑇1,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 = 0, 𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇1 + 1,𝑇𝑇1 + 2, …𝑇𝑇, 0 < lim𝑁𝑁→∞(𝑇𝑇1/𝑇𝑇) ≤ 1. TheFisher test first 
computes the p-value 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖for each group using the Phillips-Perron unit-root test. Then it computes the 
statistic −2∑ log𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 , which follows a 𝜒𝜒2 distribution with 2N degrees of freedom under the null. We 
report the p-values of the 𝜒𝜒2 statistics in this table. Results are reported for the lag length p=1, but are 
not highly sensitive to this choice. These tests are computed using the command xtfisher in Stata. 
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 Appendix D: Robustness checks of benchmark results using the Pooled 
Mean-group and Mean-group estimations 
 
Table D.1: Short-term and long-term expenditure elasticities: OLS, pooled 
mean-group (PMG) and unweighted mean-group (MG) estimations 
 
 
OLS PMG MG 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆ ln𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 <1994 >1994 <1994 >1994 <1994 >1994 
Convergence speed 
      ln𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 -0.613*** -0.438*** -0.659*** -0.486*** -0.709*** -0.614*** 
 
(0.020) (0.039) (0.031) (0.040) (0.042) (0.049) 
SR coefficients       [∆ln𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡] 1.378*** 0.230 1.926*** -0.544** 2.032*** -1.148*** 
 
(0.145) (0.179) (0.142) (0.250) (0.248) (0.362) 
∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 1.569*** -0.720*** 1.994*** -1.045*** 2.300*** -1.385*** 
 
(0.169) (0.222) (0.217) (0.266) (0.339) (0.348) 
LR coefficients       [ln𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸 − ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸 ] 1.426*** 0.262 1.959*** -0.315** 2.417*** -0.884** 
 
(0.260) (0.348) (0.222) (0.160) (0.553) (0.411) ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸  2.880*** 0.738** 2.487*** 0.959*** 2.778*** 1.294*** 
 
(0.245) (0.272) (0.176) (0.129) (0.424) (0.309) 
Region-specific trend yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 449 540 449 540 449 540 
Number of groups 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Notes: We report the OLS, Pooled Mean-group (PMG) and the unweighted Mean-group (MG) 
estimation results based on Equation 4. Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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 Table D.2: Short-term and long-term revenue elasticity: OLS, Pooled 
mean-group and mean-group estimations 
 
 
OLS PMG MG 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆ ln𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 <1994 >1994 <1994 >1994 <1994 >1994 
Convergence speed 
      ln𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 -0.540*** -0.335*** -0.625*** -0.520*** -0.751*** -0.692*** 
 
(0.044) (0.055) (0.051) (0.069) (0.061) (0.061) 
SR coefficients       [∆ln𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡] 1.463*** 0.831*** 1.930*** 0.482 1.799*** -0.061 
 
(0.151) (0.272) (0.215) (0.320) (0.359) (0.424) 
∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 1.495*** 0.973*** 1.808*** 0.713*** 2.017*** 0.475 
 
(0.200) (0.215) (0.260) (0.236) (0.386) (0.314) 
LR coefficients       [ln𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸 − ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸 ] 1.774*** 2.249*** 1.808*** 2.215*** 2.175*** 1.787*** 
 
(0.353) (0.394) (0.157) (0.126) (0.636) (0.570) ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸  2.118*** 2.590*** 1.417*** 1.798*** 2.092*** 2.510*** 
 
(0.303) (0.411) (0.128) (0.113) (0.450) (0.667) 
Region-specific trend yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 449 540 449 540 449 540 
Number of groups 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Notes: We report the OLS, Pooled Mean-group (PMG) and the unweighted Mean-group (MG) 
estimation results based on Equation 4. Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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 Table D.3: Short-term and long-term elasticity of net transfers: OLS, Pooled 
mean-group and mean-group estimations 
 
  (1) (3) (5) 
∆ ln𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 OLS  PMG  MG  
Convergence speed       ln𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 -0.643*** -0.751*** -0.877*** 
 
(0.048) (0.052) (0.057) 
SR coefficients    [∆ln𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − ∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡] -0.179 -0.563 -1.437 
 
(0.479) (0.817) (0.978) 
∆ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 -2.089*** -2.654*** -2.973*** 
 
(0.238) (0.362) (0.578) 
LR coefficients 
  [ln𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸 − ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸 ] -1.357*** -1.713*** -2.979*** 
 
(0.338) (0.220) (0.491) ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸  -1.478*** -0.916*** -0.708* 
 
(0.286) (0.172) (0.392) 
Region-specific trend yes yes yes 
Observations 508 508 508 
Number of groups 30 30 30  
Notes: We report the OLS, Pooled Mean-group (PMG) and the unweighted Mean-group (MG) 
estimation results based on Equation 4. Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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